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Deferring Ineffectiveness Claims to Collateral
Review: Ensuring Equal Access and a Right to
Appointed Counsel
Thomas M. Place'
INTRODUCTION

T

United States Supreme Court has long recognized a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel at trial.' More recently, the
Court has held that a defendant also has a right to effective assistance
of counsel on direct appeal.3 Neither the right to effective assistance of
counsel at trial nor the right to effective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal is dependent on the length of the defendant's imprisonment.4
Rather, to assure fairness in each proceeding, the defendant has a right
to counsel and the concomitant right that counsel provides effective
assistance. 5 In some cases, a defendant can protect the right of effective
assistance at trial on direct appeal; 6 but, as the Supreme Court has noted,
in many cases "collateral review will frequently be the only means through
HE

i Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University. A
special thanks to Grace D'Alo and Harvey Feldman for their thoughtful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article and to Erin Kawa and Ryan Lockman for excellent research assistance.
2 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932) (stating that a state's duty to provide
counsel to an indigent defendant is "not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under
such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of
the case").
3 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) ("A first appeal as of right therefore is not
adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney.").
4 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972) (holding that the right to effective
counsel at trial attaches when there is a constitutional right to appointed and retained counsel, however, the proceeding is classified if it results in an "imprisonment even for a brief
period").
5 Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).
6 As a general rule, in order for the issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness to be raised on direct appeal, new counsel needs to be appointed or retained and must present the ineffectiveness claim to the trial court in a motion for new trial. See United States v. McGill, 952 Fad 16,
19 (Ist
Cir. 1991). Even when new counsel is appointed, because many jurisdictions require a
motion for new trial to be filed within a short time period following trial, new counsel may not
have sufficient time to discover possible claims of ineffectiveness not apparent on the record.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., MD.RULES 4-331 (a) (ten days); Ky. R .CRIM. P. i o.o6( ) (five days); PA.
R. CRIM.P. 720 (A)(i) (ten days); see also infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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which an accused can effectuate the right to counsel .... I, This will be the
case if trial counsel represents the defendant on direct appeal8 because it
is unlikely that counsel will identify his own ineffectiveness in challenging
the conviction.9 In such a case, a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel
must be presented in a collateral proceeding, 1° or it may be found to have
been waived." When new counsel appointed or retained for direct appeal
raises a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness on direct appeal, and the
record is incomplete or inadequate for purposes of deciding the claim,
many states will defer the claim to the collateral review process instead of
remanding the claim to the trial court."2 In states that require the claim to
be raised on direct appeal and new counsel fails to do so, the claim is waived
unless asserted as a claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness in a collateral
proceeding. 3 Even record-based claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness

7 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,378 (1986).
8 In numerous states, counsel appointed for trial also has the obligation to represent the
defendant on direct appeal. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § I9-852(b)(i)-(3) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-4503(a) (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 6I1. 18 (West 2009); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-I 5-15 (West
2oo6); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-103 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3904 (2OO8); N.C. GEN STAT.
§ 7A-45I(b) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-203 (2OO6); ALA. R. CaIM. P. 6.2(b); ARz. R.
CRIM. P. 6.3(b); DEL. R. CRIM. P. SuP. CT. 39(e); HAW. REV. STAT. §802-5(a) (Supp. 2007); IowA
R. CRIM. P. 2.28(1); MD. RULE 4-2I4(b);N. H. Sup. CT. R. 32(1); PA. R. CRIM. P. I22(B)(2); S.C.
RULE 602(e)(i); Wy. R. CrIM. P. 44(a)(i ); see also Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals 2.2(a)
(1978).
9 See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 6zo n.5 (zoo5) ("A lawyer may not, however,
perceive his own errors .... "); White v. Kelso, 401 S.E.2d 733, 734 (Ga. 1991) ("[An attorney
cannot reasonably be expected to assert or argue his or her own ineffectiveness .... "); People
v. Moore, 797 N.E.2d 631, 638 (111. 2003) ("It would be inappropriate for trial counsel to argue
a motion that is predicated on allegations of counsel's own incompetence."); Commonwealth
v. Saranchak, 866 A.zd 292, 299 n.9 (Pa. 2005) ("ITirial counsel cannot be expected to raise
his own ineffectiveness on direct appeal .... "); Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 8o8, 812 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000) ("[lit is unrealistic to expect that the attorney charged with ineffectiveness
will subsequently realize all of his mistakes and be able to adequately prosecute the claim.");
Calene v. State, 846 P.zd 679,684 (Wyo. 1993) ("It is recognized that trial counsel should [not]
be ... expected to contend ineffectiveness of performance by himself .... ").
10 The terms "collateral proceeding," "collateral review," "post-conviction proceedings," or "post-conviction process," used interchangeably in this article, all describe a "class
of judicial remedies" available to criminal defendants after conviction has been affirmed on
direct appeal or after the "time for taking direct appeal has expired." i DONALD E. WILKES, JR.,
STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES & RELIEF HANDBOOK § 1.2 (2008-09 ed.).

Ii See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Waiver or Estoppelin Incompetent Legal Representation
Cases, 2 A.L.R. 4 th 807, 821-37 (I98O) (discussing cases where the consideration of claims of
ineffectiveness of counsel was found to be precluded - and cases where consideration of such
issue was found not to be precluded - on waiver or estoppel grounds because the issue had
not been raised on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings).
12 See, e.g., Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3 d 73,77 (Colo. 2003); People v. Alvarado, 683 N.Y.S.2d
501, 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); State v. Stroud, 557 S.E.2d 544, 548 (N.C. Ct. App. zooI).
13 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 573 S.E.2d 64, 65 (Ga. 2002); Taylor v. State, 156 P.3d 739, 746
(Utah 2007).

2009-2010]

DEFERRING INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS

are being shunted to the post-conviction process as states are increasingly
relieving newly appointed or retained counsel of the obligation to raise
the claim on direct appeal. 14 In federal court prosecutions, the United
States Supreme Court followed the lead of numerous states in concluding
that a post-conviction proceeding i5 in the trial court is preferable to direct16
appeal for resolving ineffectiveness claims. In Massaro v. United States,
the Court held that new counsel's failure to raise an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim on direct appeal did not bar the claim from being brought
in a later collateral proceeding in the trial court, the court "best suited" to
developing the facts necessary to resolve ineffectiveness claims. 7 Finally,
state collateral review is the only means for a defendant to challenge the
performance of direct appeal counsel.'"
This article examines the consequences of states' increased reliance
on post-conviction proceedings to review claims of trial counsel
ineffectiveness. One result of deferring ineffectiveness claims to the postconviction process is that it leaves a significant number of defendants who
receive short prison sentences 19 without a remedy "to vindicate their right
to effective trial counsel." 0 This occurs because many states limit access
to post--conviction remedies to defendants who are in custody at the time.'
14 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davido, 868 A.zd 431,441 n. 16 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth
v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002).
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2oo6) (describing a prisoner's remedies on motion attacking
sentence).
i6 Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003).
17 Id.at 505.
i8 See, e.g.,Tolbert v. State, 773 So. 2d 901, 903 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Jackson, 747
N.W.2d 418,430 (Neb. 2oo8); Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.zd 564,569-70 (Pa. 1999).
i9 Nationwide, more than 68,ooo defendants were sentenced in 2006 to a year or less of
imprisonment. See WILLIAM J.SABOL, ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2006 I, 6 (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/po6.pdf. The median prison sentence for felonies in 2004 was about three years
(thirty-seven months). MATTHEW DUROSE & PATRICK LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004 3 (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssco4.pdf. In Pennsylvania, more than fifteen
percent of defendants received a sentence of one year or less in 2oo6 (the most recent for
which such data is available). E-mail from Joan Lisle, Field Services Manager, Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing, to Thomas M. Place, Professor of Law, Penn State University,
Dickinson School of Law (June 29, 2007, 12:oo EST) (on file with author).
2o Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986).
21 In twenty-four states, the post-conviction remedy is limited to defendants who are
imprisoned or on probation or parole. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-466(a)(I)-(2) (West
Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-I (2006); KAN.STAT. ANN. § 6o-1507(a) (2oo6); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 924()-(2), 926(B)(I); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2124(I)(A)-(E)
(Supp. 20o8); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-101 (LexisNexis 2oo8); MASS ANN. LAWS. P. R.
CRIM. 30(a); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5(1) (West 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 547.360(I) (West
2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (2OO8); NEV. REV. STAT. 88 34.36o, 34.724 (2005); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 534:1 (LexisNexis 2oo6); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-11-6 (LexisNexis 1984); 42 PA.
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If the defendant's prison sentence is completed during the period while
direct appeal is pending"2 or, in some jurisdictions, before the collateral
process is completed,' the defendant is shut out of the only forum able
to hear his claims. The custody requirement also deprives defendants
who have already completed their sentence of access to post-conviction
24
proceedings to challenge the ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel.
Finally, in contrast to direct appeal, even if the state's collateral process is
open to defendants who have completed their sentences, states do not have
an obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to appoint counsel for
indigent defendants seeking state post-conviction relief.2" In some states,
appointment of counsel in a collateral proceeding is not mandated by statute
or court rule.26 When a state provides counsel, either by statute or court
rule, because the right is not constitutionally based, counsel's performance
is not subject to the federal standard governing ineffectiveness claims.27
Moreover, in some states that provide counsel, the defendant does not have
28
a state law right to effective post-conviction counsel.
CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 9543(a)(i) (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED

LAWS § 21-27-1

(I987); TENN.CODE

ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7131 (1998); WVA. CODE ANN. § 53-4Ai(a) (LexisNexis 2008); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 974.06 (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-14-Ioi(b)
(2009); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(a); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(a)(1) (Delaware also allows a

defendants subject to future custody to seek relief in a post-conviction proceeding); Ky. R.
CRIM. P. 11.42(1); WASH. R. App. P. 16.4(a)-(b). In Texas, confinement is broadly defined to
include actual confinement and any collateral consequences resulting from the conviction
that is the basis for the post-conviction petition. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 11.07, §3(c)
(Vernon 2oo8).
22 Depending on the jurisdiction, direct appeals may take several years or longer. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 88o A.2d 597,602 (Pa. 2005) (noting "instances where a direct
appeal took more than four years to be completed"); see also Speedy Trial, 35 GEO.L .J.
ANN.
REV. CRIM.PRO. 360 n. 1210 (2oo6) (noting cases of appellate delay from two to thirteen years
in length); Eve Bresnike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679,693 (2007) (noting that it takes four or five
years in many jurisdictions for the appellate process to be completed).
23 In some states, to obtain collateral relief the defendant must be in custody at the time
relief is granted. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543(a)(i) (West 2007); ARK. R. CRIM. P.
37.1.
24 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (establishing the right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal).
25 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 , 555 (1987) ("We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions and we decline to so hold today.") (citation omitted); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13
(1989) (plurality opinion) ("[Tlhe rule of Pennsylvaniav. Finley should apply no differently in
capital cases than in noncapital cases.").
26 See I WILKES, supra note I, at § 1.5. In some states that authorize appointment of
counsel, the appointment occurs only after the defendant has filed a pro se petition. See, e.g.,
PA. R. CRIM. P. 904(C).
27 Coleman v. Thompson, 5O1 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586,
587-88 (1982) (per curiam).
28 See IWILKES,supra note to, at § 1.5; see also Celestine Richards McConville, The Right
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The Article begins with a discussion of the right to effective assistance
of counsel. Part I reviews Supreme Court decisions establishing that
the right to counsel is the right to effective counsel, and that this right
applies without regard to the defendant's length of imprisonment. This
section also notes the Court's decisions extending the right to effective
counsel to direct appeals. Part II explores the problems with presenting
ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal, the development of state collateral
proceedings, and the consequences of moving ineffectiveness claims from
direct appeal to the collateral review process. Part III addresses the fact
that a growing number of defendants are unable to assert challenges to
the effectiveness of their counsel because many states make custody a
condition for collateral review. The Article argues that when a state closes
its appellate process to claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel-either
directly or indirectly by requiring appointed trial counsel to represent the
defendant on direct appeal-it is a denial of due process and equal protection
to deprive defendants who have already completed their sentences, while
their direct appeal is pending, of access to the collateral review process in
order to challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel. Part III further argues
that it is similarly a denial of equal protection for states to prevent these
defendants from challenging the effectiveness of direct-appeal counsel.
Lastly, Part IV considers the issue of appointment of counsel and argues
that when the collateral review process substitutes for direct appeal, an
indigent defendant has a constitutional right to counsel in the collateral
proceeding.
I. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In Powell v. Alabama,9 the first case in which the Supreme Court
considered the issue of an indigent defendant's right to counsel, the Court
recognized that the right to effective assistance of counsel was inseparable
from the right to counsel.30 In numerous post-Powell decisions, the Court
explained that the right to effective counsel is rooted in the essential role
31
counsel plays in assuring that the rights of the defendant are protected.
to Effective Assistance of Capital Postconviction Counsel Constitutional Implications of Statutory
Grants of Capital Counsel, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 31, 67-68 (arguing that when a state creates a
statutory right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, the Constitution compels counsel
to provide effective assistance).
29 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
30 Id. at 71. In Powell, the Court stated that when due process requires the state to
provide counsel to an indigent, "that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and
trial of the case." Id. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (holding that right
to counsel violated when judicial action denied defendant's "right to have the effective assistance of counsel").
31 See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,309 (1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
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Vigorous partisan advocacy is central to the proper functioning of the
adversarial process in assuring a fair trial.32 When counsel for the defendant
fails to provide effective assistance, the prosecution's case is not subjected
to "meaningful adversarial testing."33 Because such a trial is not a
"confrontation between adversaries," 4 it "cannot be relied upon as having
produced a just result."3 For this reason, the Court has long recognized
that the "right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel."36
The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the first appeal.37
Like trial, direct appeal is an adversarial proceeding, and without a lawyer an
appellant would not have a fair opportunity to establish that his conviction
was unlawful. 38 A lawyer retained or appointed for appeal, like trial counsel,
25, 31-32 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458,462-63 (1938).
32 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,656 (1984); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,
862 (i975).
33 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656.
34 Id. at 657.
35 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,686 (1984); see also id. at 685 ("[Clounsel's skill
and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ample opportunity to meet the case of
the prosecution.") (internal quotation omitted); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343
(198o) (noting that if defendant does not receive effective assistance of counsel, "a serious risk
of injustice infects the trial itself").
36 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986); see McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("[Ihf the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel .... "). In Cronic,
the Court explained that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is grounded
in the language of the Sixth Amendment:
The special value of the right to the assistance of counsel explains
why "it has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel." The text of the Sixth Amendment
itself suggests as much. The Amendment requires not merely the provision of counsel to the accused, but "Assistance," which is to be "for his
defence [sic]." Thus, "the core purpose of the counsel guarantee was
to assure 'Assistance' at trial .... " If no actual "Assistance" "for" the
accused's "defence [sic]" is provided, then the constitutional guarantee
has been violated.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654 (quoting first from McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n. 14, then from Ash, 413
U.S. at 309); see Strickland,466 U.S. at 685 (stating that the fact "[t]hat a person who happens
to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused ... is not enough to satisfy" the Sixth
Amendment).
37 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). In Evitts, privately retained counsel's failure
to file a statement of appeal resulted in dismissal of direct appeal. In finding that the constitutional right to counsel and the concomitant right to effective counsel applied to retained
counsel, the Court rejected the state's claim that the right to counsel on appeal was rooted
exclusively in the Equal Protection Clause, concluding instead that due process had played a
significant role in its prior appeal decisions. Id. at 404-05.
38 Id. at 396; see Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance ofAppellate Counsel,97 W. VA.
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must provide effective representation for the appellate proceeding to
resolve appellant's claims fairly.39 When counsel fails to provide effective
representation, the appellant "is in no better position than one who has no
counsel at all." 4
The right to counsel at trial4 ' and the concomitant right to effective
counsel apply without regard to the length of the sentence of imprisonment
imposed. 41 In every situation where a defendant enjoys a constitutional
right to counsel at trial 43 and on appeal,' he or she is entitled to effective
counsel 4 5-regardless of whether counsel is retained by the defendant or
appointed by the court. 6
II.

CHALLENGING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL COUNSEL

A. DirectAppeal
47
Although there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction,

L. REV. 1,36 n.227.
39 Evitts,469 U.S. at 396 (stating that a first appeal is "not adjudicated in accord with due
process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney").
40 Id.
41 A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel when charged with a felony,
Gideon v. Wainwright,372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), and, for a less serious charge, when a sentence
of imprisonment is imposed. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.367, 374 (1979) (affirming Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) which held that "no indigent criminal defendant [can] be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right to assistance
of appointed counsel in his defense"); see
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (noting
that a suspended sentence may not be imposed unless the defendant was provided counsel).
42 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33 (deciding that defense counsel must be appointed in any
criminal prosecution however classified "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief
period").
43 See supra note 36; see also Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586,587-88 (1982) (per curiam)
(linking right to effective counsel to underlying right to counsel).
44 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,357-58 (1963).
45 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court established a two-part
performance and prejudice standard that governs claims of ineffectiveness of counsel.
Under Strickland, a defendant is deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel if
counsel's representation is (i) deficient, meaning counsel's performance fell "below an
objective standard of reasonableness", and (2) "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." The Strickland standard applies
to claims of ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285
(2000).

46 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,344-45 (1980).
47 See, e.g., Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 15, 120 (1995) (per curiam); Jones v. Barnes, 463
U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.
684, 687 (1894); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (acknowledging "that a State
[sic] is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts" but noting that
"[aill of the States [sic] now provide some method of appeal from criminal convictions"). But
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a first appeal as of right is guaranteed by statute or state constitutional
provision in almost all jurisdictions. 4" Direct appeal provides a defendant
an opportunity "to demonstrate that the conviction.. . is unlawful."4 9 To
insure that the appeal 0 is "adequate and effective,"5 1 a defendant is entitled
to certain "minimum safeguards,""2 including the right to counsel.53 Almost
all jurisdictions permit an appeal to continue if the defendant completes his
sentence during the pendency of the appeal if the defendant would suffer
collateral consequences as a result of the conviction.5 4 As a general rule,
a defendant is required to raise on direct appeal all grounds for reversal,55
and appellate review is limited to issues raised and considered by the trial

see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 757 n.i (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (questioning whether
the Court would reaffirm prior holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal but noting "a case presenting this question is unlikely to arise... [because] a right of appeal is now
universal for all significant criminal convictions"). For a discussion of a right to appeal, see
David Rossman, Were There No Appeal: The History of Review in American CriminalCourts,81 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 519-20 (1990); see also Daniel Givelber, Gideon-A Generation
Later: The Right to Counsel in Collateral,Post-ConvictionProceedings,58 MD. L .REV. 1393, 1396
n.22 (1999).
48 Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia provide for appeal as of right by statute. In eleven states, the right is guaranteed by constitution. See Rosanna Cavallaro, Better
Off Dead: Abatement, Innocence, and the Evolving Right of Appeal, 73 U. CoLo. L. REV. 943, 946
n. 12 (2002) (compiling appeal provisions in every jurisdiction); see also Appendix in Bundy
v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, app. at 136-42 (ist Cir. 1987). In Virginia, West Virginia, and New
Hampshire there is discretionary appellate review but no appeal as of right. See VA. CODE ANN.
§17-1-405 (2003); W.VA. CODE ANN. §5 8-5-i(j) (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. Sup. CT. R. 7(I).
49 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); see SPEcIAL COMM. ON STANDARDS FOR THE
ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AM. BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING To CRIMINAL APPEALS § I.2(a)(i) (1970) ("The structure of appellate
courts should be consonant with the purposes of appellate review... [which is] [tio protect
defendants against prejudicial error in the proceedings leading to conviction....").
50 In the majority of states, the appeal of right is available to all defendants without
regard to the seriousness of the offense or the sentence imposed. See e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II,
§ 24; IND. CONST. art. VII, § 6; Ky. CONST. § I 15; PA. CONST. art. V, § 9;FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 924.0506 (West 2oo1); MONT. CODE ANN. §46-20-104 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7401 (1998).
51 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956).
52 Evitts, 469 U.S at 392.
53 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
54 See, e.g., People v. Jordan, 6o8 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); State v. Jones, 516
N.W.2d 545,546 n. I (Minn. 1994); State v. Patterson, 465 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Neb. 1991); Angle
v. State, 942 P.2d 177, I8o n.i (Nev. 1997); People v. DeLeo, 585 N.Y.S.zd 629,630-31 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992); State v. Key, 388 N.W.2d 866, 868 (N.D. 1986); State v. Golston, 643 N.E.zd
io9, III(Ohio 1994); State v. Raines, 922 P.zd 1oo, 101 (Wash. Ct.App. 1996). But see State v.
Snowman, 698 A.zd 1057, 1O58 (Me. 1997). In Sibron v. New York, the Supreme Court adopted
a rule for federal courts that a criminal case is not mooted by completion of the sentence unless "it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968).
55 Seee.g., Guinan v. United States, 6 F3d 468, 4 7 1 (7th Cir. 1993), abrogatedby Massaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003).

2009-2010]

DEFERRING INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS

court.5 6 As a result, appellate courts generally decline to consider matters

raised on appeal for the first time because the absence of a trial court
opinion on the matter presents a "substantial impediment to meaningful
and effective appellate review." 7
Claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel do not fit comfortably within5
the general model of appellate review without some restructuring.
Because it is unlikely that trial counsel will identify his own act or omission
59
as ineffective assistance, the issue is rarely presented to the trial court.
When trial counsel represents the defendant on appeal,6' it is equally
unlikely that counsel will identify his own ineffectiveness as a basis for
challenging the defendant's conviction on appeal. 6' The issue will often
escape consideration by the trial and appellate court even when new
counsel is appointed for the appellate process. 6 When the issue of trial
counsel ineffectiveness is not record-based, 63 it is unlikely that new counsel
will identify and present the issue to the trial court in a motion for new trial,
which would provide a record of the claim that is reviewable on appeal.' 4 In
56

ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES §3.1 (2d ed. 1989).
57 Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306,308 (Pa. 1998); seeMassaro, 538 U.S. at 505-06.
58 States could structure direct appeal in a manner that allows for meaningful review
of claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel by requiring new post-trial counsel and allowing
the trial record to be supplemented to support the claim of ineffectiveness. For an argument
advocating such reform, see Primus supra note 22, at 7o6-21. See also Nancy J. King & Joseph
L. Hoffmann, Envisioning Post-Conviction Review for the Twenty-First Century, 78 Miss. L.J.
433, 448 n.58 (2008). For proposed changes in one state's rules governing appointment of
counsel and post-trial motion procedure to permit appellate review of claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, see Thomas M. Place, Ineffectiveness of Counsel and Short-Term Sentences
in Pennsylvania: A Claim in Search of a Remedy, 17 TMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 109 (2007);
see also infra note 73 and accompanying text for discussion of remand by appellate courts to
permit the trial court to make findings on claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
59 See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605,62o n.5 (2005).
60 See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(b)(2) (appointment of trial counsel "effective until final
judgment, including any proceedings upon direct appeal"); N.H. Sup. CT. R. 32(1) ("Whether
retained by the defendant or appointed by a trial court, trial counsel in a criminal case shall be
responsible for representing the defendant in the supreme court.
61 See infra note 9.
62 See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some
Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v. United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 793, 797 (zo°4).
63 In Woods v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court identified three kinds of ineffectiveness
of trial counsel claims: (I) claims based on the trial record not requiring extrinsic proof; (2)
claims involving counsel's performance "not visible at all on the trial record, or that require
additional record development"; and (3) "hybrid" claims, namely claims that are based on
the record "but whose evaluation requires a showing to rebut the presumption of counsel
competence." Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 12o8, 1211-12 (Ind. 1998); see Calene v. State, 846
P.2d 679, 684 (Wyo. 1993) (classifying ineffectiveness claims as either arising from events not
controlled by counsel or involving decisions by counsel and noting that the basis for counsel's
acts or omissions "will frequently not be documented in the trial record").
64 Some courts have held that appellate counsel is not ineffective in failing to uncover
extra-record claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Kitt v. Clarke, 931 F.zd 1246,
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other cases, the appointment or retention of new counsel may occur after
the time permitted to present an on-the-record claim of ineffectiveness
to the trial court 65 in order to preserve the issue for appellate review has
passed. Finally, the claim may be presented by new counsel for the first
time on direct appeal "on a trial record not developed ... for the object of
litigating ... the [ineffectiveness] claim .. .. "
Because claims of "ineffective assistance of counsel elude[] onceand-for-all disposition,"67 it is not surprising that courts have different
approaches regarding when the claim should be raised and when failure68
to present the claim precludes its consideration in a later proceeding.
If the record is adequate to decide the matter, some states require new
counsel to raise the claim on direct appeal or the claim is waived. 69 When
ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on direct appeal and the record is
incomplete, the appellate court in some states will remand the case to the

1249-50(8th Cir. i99I); Wilson v. State, 565 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); see also Lissa
Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel,97 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 38 (I994). Even
if identified as an issue by new counsel, an appellate court may deny review of the ineffectiveness claim on the grounds that the issue was not raised and preserved at trial. See CHRISTOPHER
H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND
CONCEPTS § 29.o2(e) (5th ed. 2008); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 640
(4th ed. 2004) ("An ineffectiveness claim raised on appeal is limited to what the trial record

reveals...."). A claim not raised at trial may nonetheless be reviewed on appeal if it meets the
jurisdiction's standard governing "plain error." See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez-Benitez,
542 U.S. 74,81-83 (2004); State v. Burns, 925 A.zd 1041, 1057-58 (N.J. 2007).

65 In most jurisdictions, a motion for a new trial must be filed within a brief time following imposition of sentence. See e.g., FED. R.CRIM. P. 33(b)(2) (seven days); CONN. Sup. CT. R. §
42-54 (five days); FLA. R. CRIM P. 3.59o(a)-(b) (ten days); Ky. R. CRIM P. IO.O6(I) (five days);
MD. CODE ANN., MD. RULES § 4-33 I(a) (LexisNexis 2oo9) (ten days); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST

CT. 5-614(C) (ten days); PA. R. CRIM. P. 72o(A) (ten days).
66 Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003).

67 Guinan v. United States, 6 F3d 468, 473 (7th Cit. 1993) (Easterbrook, J., concurring),
abrogatedby Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003).
68 The collateral review process presents the first opportunity for the defendant to assert
the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. For a summary of the various approaches of when
ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims should be raised, see LAFAVE, supra note 64, at 614-15.
69 See, e.g., Garland v. State, 657 S.E.2d 842, 844 (Ga. 2008) (holding that new counsel must raise claim of ineffectiveness "at the earliest practicable moment to avoid it being deemed waived"); Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007) ("When a claim of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel can be adjudicated on the basis of the trial record, it must be
brought on direct appeal or it is barred ... if raised in a postconviction petition."); Torres v.
State, 688 N.W.zd 569, 572 (Minn. 2004) (declining to adopt holding ofMassaro v. UnitedStates
and reaffirming prior case law that "all claims brought or known on direct appeal are barred
from consideration in a collateral proceeding"); State v. Suggs, 613 N.W.2d 8, 1I (Neb. 2000)
(barring post-conviction review "where different attorney represented a defendant on direct
appeal and the alleged deficiencies in the performance of trial counsel were known or apparent from the record"); State v. Lawson, 583 S.E.2d 354,361 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a
post-conviction review of a claim of ineffectiveness is forfeited if the claim should have been
brought on direct appeal).
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trial court. 70 Other state appellate courts will defer such a case to a collateral
proceeding."' In some states, the claim cannot be heard on appeal unless
first presented to the trial court."2 In a number of states, the defendant may
elect whether to present the claim on direct appeal or in a post-conviction
proceeding.73 Increasingly, states have moved in the direction of deferring
ineffectiveness claims to the post-conviction process, 74 following the
70 See, e.g., Rice v. State, 154 P.3d, 537, 541 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that "to avoid
the delay associated with a collateral proceeding" an ineffectiveness claim may be remanded
to the trial court and the findings of the trial court are then utilized by the appellate court
to review the claim on direct appeal); State v. Roybal, 54 P.d 6I, 67 (N.M. 2002) ("If facts
necessary to a full determination [of the ineffectiveness claim] are not part of the record ...
an appellate court may remand a case for an evidentiary hearing .... "); State v. Litherland,
12 P.3d 92, 97-98 (Utah 2000) (citing UTAH R. APP. P. 23(B) which provides for remand to the
trial court for a determination of the facts necessary for an appellate court determination of a
claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness); see also Duncan v. Kerby, 85i P.2d 466, 468-69 (N.M.
1993) (acknowledging the option of remanding case to the trial court during appeal when the
record is incomplete, but noting that the state's post-conviction procedure was procedure of
choice in such a case).
71 See, e.g., State v. Silva, 864 P.2d 583,592-93 (Haw. 1993) (holding that "where record on
appeal is insufficient to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel ... appellate court may
affirm defendant's conviction without prejudice" to a collateral proceeding); State v. Cook, 667
N.W.zd 201, 220 (Neb. zoo3) (observing that if ineffectiveness claim "has not been raised or
ruled on at the trial level and requires an evidentiary hearing," the issue will not be decided
on direct appeal); State v. Stroud, 557 S.E.2d 544, 548 (N.C. Ct. App. zooi) (dismissing a
claim of ineffectiveness without prejudice to collateral proceeding where appellate court is
unable to decide claim on the face of the record); State v. Strutz, 6o6 N.W.2d 886, 894 (N.D.
2000) ("When the record on direct appeal is inadequate to determine whether the defendant received ineffective assistance, the defendant may pursue the ineffectiveness claim at
a post-conviction proceeding .... "); Downs v. State, 244 S.W.3d 51I, 515 (Tex. App. 2007)
(holding that when the record is not sufficiently developed with respect to strategies of trial
counsel, the appropriate remedy is a petition for collateral relief); see also State v. Dixon 593
A.2d 266, 285 (N.J. I99I).
72 See Robitaille v. State, 971 So. 2d 43, 69 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (observing that a defendant's failure to raise a claim of ineffectiveness in a motion for a new trial will preclude
review of claim on direct appeal); Ratchford v. State, 159 S.W.3d 304, 309 (Ark. 2004) (noting
the "well-settled rule" that an allegation of ineffectiveness must be raised in the trial court for
the issue to be considered on direct appeal).
73 See, e.g., State v. Yakovac, 18o P.3 d 476, 482 (Idaho 2oo8) (observing that defendant
has the choice of raising an ineffectiveness claim in a direct appeal or in a post-conviction
proceeding "but once she has elected a remedy, she must bear the burden of that choice")
(citation omitted); Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.zd 939, 941 (Ind. zoo8) ("A criminal defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel is at liberty to elect whether to raise this claim
on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings.").
74 See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) (laying down general rule that
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel will no longer be reviewed on direct appeal but
instead deferred to the post-conviction process). Prior to Grant,a claim of ineffectiveness
of prior counsel was waived unless raised "at the earliest stage of the proceedings at which
counsel whose ineffectiveness is being challenged no longer represents the defendant."
Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.zd 687, 695 n.6 (Pa. 1977), overruledby Commonwealth
v. Grant, 813 A.zd 726 (Pa. 2002). The Hubbard rule required new counsel on direct appeal
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lead of a number of jurisdictions that generally preclude consideration of
ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal.7"
States have moved claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel from direct
appeal to the post-conviction process principally because the basis for the
claim may not appear on the record even where new counsel is appointed or
retained for direct appeal.7 6 Claims of ineffectiveness based upon omissions
by counsel frequently require fact-finding and, in many cases, an evidentiary
hearing in which trial counsel has an opportunity to explain his strategy."
When the record reflects the act that the defendant alleges was the result of
ineffectiveness, the record rarely contains the reasons for counsel's action.78
Collateral review, it has been argued, provides an opportunity to develop a
factual basis for a claim that counsel's performance at trial did not meet the
standard for effective assistance of counsel.7 9 Lastly, courts have deferred

to raise a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel notwithstanding the fact that the claim had
not been presented to the trial court. Id. See also Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo.
2003) ("In light of the considerations potentially involved in determining ineffective assistance [claims], defendants have regularly been discouraged from attempting to litigate their
counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal."); People v. Kunze, 550 N.E.zd 284, 296 (Ill. App.
Ct. i99o) (stating that resolution of claims of ineffectiveness are often better made in proceedings for post-conviction relief); State v. Vincent, 971 So. zd 363, 374 (La. Ct. App. 2007) ("An
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is most appropriately addressed through an application
for post-conviction relief filed in the trial court .... "); Mosley v. State, 836 A.zd 678,692 (Md.
2003) (concluding that the post-conviction proceeding is the most appropriate way to raise a
claim of ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. Zinser, 847 N.E.zd 1095, 1097 n.2 (Mass. 2oo6)
("[C]ase law strongly disfavors raising ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal."); Duncan, 851
P.zd at 469 (finding that habeas proceedings preferred to direct appeal for adjudicating ineffectiveness claims); Stroud,557 S.E.2d at 548 (holding that the preferable forum for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is collateral review); ExparteWhite, i6o S.W.3d 46, 48 n. 1
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (noting that ineffectiveness claims most effectively raised in habeas
proceedings).
75 See, e.g., State ex rel. Thomas v. Rayes, 153 P.3d IO4O, io44 (Ariz. 2007) (holding that
ineffectiveness claim may be brought only in a post-conviction proceeding); State v. Spreitz,
39 P.3d 525,526 (Ariz. 2002) (holding that ineffectiveness claims "will not be addressed by the
appellate courts regardless of merit"); State v. Nichols, 698 A.zd 521, 522 (Me. 1997) ("Today
we make clear that we will not consider a claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal .... ); Hall v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.zd 343,347 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) ("Claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be raised on direct appeal.").
76 See e.g., Guinan v. United States, 6 E3d 468, 471 ( 7th Cir. 1993).
77 See e.g., State v. Preciose, 609 A.zd i28o, 1285 (N.J. 1992) (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel claims "involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record");
Duncan, 851 P.2d at 468-69 ("[T]he record before the trial court may not adequately document
the sort of evidence essential to a determination of trial counsel ineffectiveness [and] ...
[c]onsequently, an evidentiary hearing on the issue... may be necessary."); People v. Alvarado,
683 N.Y.S.zd 501, 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) ("Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim would require a [collateral] motion, since the claim is based upon facts dehors the record
and counsel has had no opportunity to explain his strategy.").
78 Guinan, 6 E3d at 473 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
79 United States v. Cocivera, 104 E3d 566, 570 (3d Cir.1996).
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ineffectiveness claims to collateral review to enable the trial court to make
findings related to the performance of trial counsel and to assess the impact
of counsel's acts or omissions on the trial.80
The United States Supreme Court found this reasoning persuasive in
Massaro v. United States.8' In Massaro, the Court resolved a dispute among
the federal courts of appeals as to whether an ineffectiveness of trial counsel
claim in a federal criminal case is waived if new counsel fails to raise the
issue on direct appeal.8 The Court held that a claim of ineffectiveness
of trial counsel can be brought in a collateral proceeding "whether or not
the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal."83 The Court
concluded that a collateral proceeding is "preferable to direct appeal"' as
the trial court is the "forum best suited"85 "for determining the effectiveness
of counsel's conduct and whether any deficiencies were prejudicial."'
B. CollateralReview of Ineffectiveness Claims
States began adopting post-conviction procedures in the 1950s in
response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Youngv. Ragen.Y8
In Young, the Court held that because defendants must exhaust state court
remedies prior to seeking federal habeas corpus relief, states must provide
defendants "some clearly defined method by which they may raise claims of
denial of federal rights. 88s In response to Young, some states broadened their
writ of habeas corpus to permit defendants to present federal constitutional

80 See, e.g., United States v. Galloway, 56 E 3 d 1239, 1240 (soth Cir. 1995); United States
v. Mala, 7 Fd 1058, io63 (1st Cir. 1993); Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.zd 726, 736 (Pa.
2002).

8I Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003).
82 In Massaro, new counsel on direct appeal failed to raise a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness that was evident from the record. When the claim was later presented in a collateral proceeding, the district court concluded that the claim was procedurally defaulted. The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Massaro was procedurally barred from
bringing the ineffectiveness claim on collateral review. Id. at 503.
83 Id.at 504. Noting that there may be cases in which an ineffectiveness claim can be resolved on direct appeal, the Court refused to adopt a rule that required ineffectiveness claims
be deferred to the post-conviction process. Id. at 5o8.
84 Id. at 504. The Court stated that the problem with a procedural default rule is that
it would require a defendant to raise the claim of ineffectiveness before "there has been an
opportunity to fully develop the factual predicate for the claim." Id.
85 Id.at 505.
86 Id. at 506.
87 Youngv. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
88 Id. at 239. The Court further noted that "Itihe doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies ... presupposes that some adequate state remedy exists." Id. at 238-39.
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challenges to their convictions.' Others expanded the writ of coram nobis.9
A smaller number of states enacted post--conviction procedures that were
influenced by the Uniform Post Conviction Act 91 and the ABA Standards
Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies. 9
In 1965, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of the absence of
adequate state post-conviction remedies in Case v. Nebraska.93 In Case,
the Court granted certiorari to decide whether states had an obligation
under the Fourteenth Amendment to establish an "adequate corrective
process for the hearing and determination of claims of violation of federal
constitutional guarantees." 94 The Court remanded the case following
Nebraska's enactment of a statute providing a collateral procedure to hear
and decide federal constitutional claims. 95 However, concurring opinions
noted that the "great variations in the scope and availability of [state
collateral proceedings remained] entirely inadequate," 96 and urged states
to adopt sufficiently broad procedures that were "swift... simple and easily
invoked," 97 and to eliminate "rigid and technical doctrines of forfeiture,
waiver, or default." 98
89 See, e.g., Sewell v. Lainson, 57 N.W.zd 556, 562-64 (Iowa 1953); Rice v. Davis, 366
S.W.2d 153, 156-57 (Ky. 1963); Huffman v. Alexander, 251 P.zd 87, 98, I07-O8 (Or. 1952); Ex

Parte Bush, 313 S.W.2d 287, 288-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958).
90 See, e.g., State ex rel. McManamon v. Blackford Circuit Court, 95 N.E.2d 556, 559, 56I
(Ind. 1950); People v. Monahan, 217 N.E.2d 664,666 (N.Y. 1966);seealsoLARRY W.YACKLE, POST
CONVICTION REMEDIES §13 (198I); Richard B. Amandes, Coram Nobi-PanaceaorCarcinoma,7
HASTINGS L.J. 48 (1955); Edwin W. Briggs, "Coram Nobis" -Is ItEitheranAvailable or the Most
Satisfactory Post-ConvictionRemedy to Test Constitutionalityin CriminalProceedings?,17 MONT. L.
REV. i6o, 165 (1956).
91 See UNIFORM POST-CoNVICTION PROCEDURE ACT (1955) (superseded 1966, 198o); see,
e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. 88 7-101 to -3OI (LexisNexis 2oo8); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
590.O1 -. 06 (West 20o0); MONT. CODE. ANN. 88 46-21-101 to -203 (2007); see also Daniel J.
Meador, Accommodating State CriminalProcedureand FederalPostconvictionReview, 50 A.B.A. J.
928, 929-30 (1964) (noting increased federal habeas corpus review of state convictions and
arguing that state post-conviction remedies should be broadened to allow for the collateral review of claimed violations of federal constitutional rights); Note, The Uniform Post-Conviction
ProcedureAct, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1956).
92 STANDARDS RELATING TO PosT--CoNv1CTION REMEDIES (Approved Draft 198o & Supp.
1986 znd ed.); see, e.g., Clark v. North Dakota, 593 N.W.zd 329, 332 n.io (N.D. 1999) (observing that the North Dakota post-conviction statute was a codification of the 198o Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act and noting the ABA Standards were "the impetus and the
polestar" for the 198o revisions to the Uniform Act) (citations omitted).
93 Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 336-37 (1965) (per curiam) (noting that prior to the
enactment of a statute establishing a post-conviction procedure in Nebraska, habeas corpus
petitions had been limited to questions of jurisdiction and judicial power).
94 Id. at 337.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 338 (Clark, J., concurring).
97 Id. at 346-47 (Brennan, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 347. For a discussion of one state's response to the Supreme Court's decisions
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Although significant variations exist, by the 1970s most states had,
by statute" or rule, 1°° created post-conviction procedures to hear and
decide federal constitutional challenges following direct appeal. Some
states restrict the remedy to felonies. 01 Some strictly limit the time for
filing a post-conviction petition,"' while others impose no time limits.103
Many states restrict successive petitions1" and either limit the time for
presenting claims of newly discovered evidence0l or excuse such claims
from filing periods." 6 While most states bar consideration of claims on
collateral review that could have been raised on direct appeal, 107 as noted
above, increasingly states are relaxing waiver for claims of ineffectiveness
of trial counsel.108 Of significance to this Article, twenty-four states
urging states to expand their post-conviction remedies, see Michael A. Millemann, Collateral
Remedies in CriminalCases in Maryland:An Assessment, 64 MD. L. REv. 968 (2005).
99 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1473 - 1508 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14--(C), §§

9-14-40 to -53 (2006);

IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-4901 tO -4911

(2004);

MINN. STAT. ANN. §§

590.01 -. 05 (West 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3001 tO -3004 (2OO8); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2953.21-.23 (LexisNexis 2002); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9541-9546 (West 2007); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-101 to -122 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.OI-654 to -668 (2007); see also
YACKLE, supra note 90, at I6-I 7, 41-44.
ioo See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32; ARK. R. CaIM. P. 37; DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 61; FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.850; Ky. R, CRIM. P. 11.42; MICH. CT. R. 6.500; N.J. CT. R. 3.22; WASH. R. App. P.
16.3-.15, 16.17, 16.22, 16.24-.27.
ioi See, e.g., Wvo. STAT ANN. §7-14-101(b) (2009); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 24.035, 29.15.
1O2 See, e.g., ARZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.4 (in non-capital cases, nintey days after entry of judgment and sentence or thirty days after issuance of final order by appellate court); ARK. R. CRIM.
P. 37.2(C) (nintey days after entry of judgment or sixty days following decision of appellate
court); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.2I(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2009) (I8o days after
transcript filed in appellate court or I8o days after time for filing appeal); Mo. R. CRIM. P.
24.035(b)(3) (ninety days after appellate court affirms judgment or sentence or I8o days if no
appeal taken). In other states that have a statute of limitations, the periods range from one to
ten years. See i WILKES, supra note Io, at § 1.6.
103 Thirteen states do not restrict the time in which a petition for relief may be filed. See
I WILKES, supranote Io, at § 1.6.
104 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.o20(a)(6) (2008): NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-300I (2008); 42
PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 9544(a)(3) (West 2007); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(c)(3)(VI); FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.85o(h).
IO5 See, e.g. 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 9545(b)(I)-(2) (West 2007) (requiring petition based
upon newly discovered evidence to be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could have
been presented).
lO6 See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/I22-1(a)(2), (a-5) (West 2008); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROc. ANN. art. 93o.8(A) (2oo8); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 99-39--5(2) (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-27-45(C) (2003).
107 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-49oi(b) (2004); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
930.4(F) (2oo8); NEa. REv. STAT. § 29-3003 (2OO8); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2419(a) (2007); 42
PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 9544(b) (West 2007); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 61(i)( 3 ); FLA. R.
CRIM. P 3.85o(h); see also State v. Upshaw, 153 P.3d 579, 587 (Mont. 2006) (noting that a record- based claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel is waived if not raised on direct appeal).
io8 See supranotes 70, 71.
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require that a defendant be in custody at the time post-conviction relief is
sought.' °9 Some states further require that the petitioner be in custody at
the time relief is granted."' Important differences also exist with respect
to counsel. In contrast to direct appeal, states do not have an obligation
under the Fourteenth Amendment to appoint counsel for post-conviction
proceedings."' In twenty-two states and the District of Columbia, there is
no right under state law to appointed counsel in non-capital post-conviction
cases."' In a number of states that recognize a right to counsel, there is no
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel." 3 In other states,
4
the appointment of counsel is discretionary."
III. A

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ACCESS TO COLLATERAL REVIEW TO
CHALLENGE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL

A. TrialCounsel Ineffectiveness
As noted, many states require a defendant to be in custody to be eligible
for collateral review. Thus, when defendants serve their prison sentences
while direct appeals are pending or before the collateral review process
is final, deferring ineffectiveness claims to collateral review leaves these
defendants without a remedy"' to "vindicate their right to effective trial
109 See supranote z 1.

n1o See, e.g. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543(a) (West 2007); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.I(a);
Bohanan II v. State, 985 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Ark. 1999) (holding that where petitioner is released from prison and placed on parole, post-conviction petition is moot); Commonwealth v.
Ahlborn, 683 A.zd 632, 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (en bane), aff'd, 687 A.zd 375 (Pa. 1997).
o

iII See YACKLE, supranote 9 ,at 5 19.
112 See I WILKES, supra note Io,at § 1.6.
113 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-105(2) (2007); Barnett v. State, 103 S.W.3 d 765,
773 (Mo. 2003); Bejarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996); Miller v. Maass, 845 P.zd
933, 934 (Or. 1993); House v. State, 91 I S.W.2d 705, 712 (Tenn. 1995); see also I WILKES, supra

note Io, at § 1.6.
114 See, e.g.,

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § io82 (West 2003); ALA. R. CRIM. P.32.7(c); State
v. Peck, 865 P.zd 304, 306 (Mont. 1993); Johnson v. State, 705 N.W.zd 830, 836 (N.D. 2005);
White v. Haines, 618 S.E.2d 423, 433 n.23 (W.Va. 2005).

115 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania sought to remedy this problem following the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Grant to generally defer claims of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel to post-conviction review. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813
A.zd 726, 738 (Pa. 2002). In a number of cases following Grant,the Superior Court recognized
a "short sentence" exception to Grant based upon the requirement in Pennsylvania that the
defendant be in custody to be eligible for post-conviction relief. Noting that "review delayed
constitutes review denied," the exception allowed appellate review of a claim of trial counsel
ineffectiveness when the defendant's short sentence would preclude collateral review of the
claim. Commonwealth v. Salisbury, 823 A.zd 914, 916 n.I (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). The "short
sentence" exception was rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
O'Beig. Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 88o A.zd 597, 598 (Pa. 2005). The court in O'Berg concluded that the exception would undermine the rationale of the rule to defer ineffectiveness
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. counsel."' 116 Even in states that review claims of ineffectiveness on

direct appeal, if trial counsel's appointment requires the representation of
the defendant on direct appeal," 7 a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel
must be presented in a post-conviction proceeding, or it will be waived." 8
But again, in custody states, defendants who serve their prison sentences
while appeal is pending are denied access to collateral review. When a
post-conviction proceeding is the only procedure available to challenge the
effectiveness of trial counsel, a requirement that a defendant be in custody
to obtain first-tier merits review of the ineffectiveness claim violates due
process and equal protection.
The argument that it is unconstitutional for a state to deprive a
defendant who is no longer in custody of access to a post-conviction
procedure to challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel when the claim
cannot be reviewed on direct appeal rests primarily on the principles of
fairness and equal treatment that govern direct appeal. As is true of direct
appeal,11 9 the Constitution does not require states to provide defendants
with a collateral review process to correct convictions obtained in violation
of federal law.2l 0 Nonetheless, when a state elects to establish a procedure
to review convictions, it must "act in accord with the dictates of the
Constitution.... "" Once a state creates appellate courts as part of a system
for determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the procedures
used by the state in deciding appeals "must comport with the demands
of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution." '
More specifically, due process requires the state "to offer each defendant
a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits of his appeal."' 3
Equal protection prevents the state from denying a class of appellants "an

claims to the post-conviction process and was too ambiguous to be administered fairly. Id.
at 602.
116 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,378 (1986).
1'7 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
i18 See Place, supranote 58, at 113 (discussing how one state's courts have handled waiver of ineffectiveness of counsel claims).
I 19 See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
12o Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-557 (1987) (noting that the Due Process
Clause does not require states to appoint indigent defendants counsel in state post-conviction proceedings as "[s]tates have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief"). In Finley,
the defendant's claims were reviewed on direct appeal. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. I,
10 (1989) (holding that Finley "should apply no differently in capital cases than in noncapital
cases").
121 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985). The Court further noted, "The right to
appeal would be unique among state actions if it could be withdrawn without consideration of
applicable due process norms." Id. at 400-01.
122

123

Id. at 393.
Id.at 405.
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adequate opportunity"' 4 to present their claims to the appellate court.
To ensure fairness and equality of treatment' in direct appeal, states
must provide indigent appellants a transcript to make certain that the appeal
is "adequate and effective"1 6 Fair process and equality also obligate states to
provide indigent appellants with counsel on direct appeal in order to ensure
that "the one and only appeal"'2 7 as of right is more than a "meaningless
ritual."'2 8 And recently, the Court noted the unfairness of denying counsel
to indigent defendants seeking first-tier discretionary appellate review of
guilty or nolo contendere pleas. l 9 Finally, the constitutional protections that
safeguard direct appeal also govern withdrawal procedures1 30 by counsel
mandated by Douglasv. Californiaand guarantee the defendant the right to
3
effective representation.1 '
The constitutional principles of fairness and equality that govern direct
appeal also apply to collateral review when a state closes direct appeal
to claims of ineffectiveness or when the state requires trial counsel to
represent the defendant on direct appeal. In both situations, collateral
review is a first-tier merits review and functions like a direct appeal in
ensuring a defendant his due process right to an "adequate opportunity"'32
Ross v. Moffett, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (observing that decisions concerning
access to judicial processes "reflect both equal protection and due process concerns"); see also
Ross, 417 U.S. at 608-09 (noting the role of both equal protection and due process in resolving
issues of access to direct appeal).
126 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). In Griffin, the Court stated that "other methods of reporting trial proceedings could be used in some cases." Id.; see also Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193-95 (1971) (extending Griffin to an indigent appellant convicted of
an ordinance violation punishable by a fine only); M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 1o6 (finding unconstitutional a state requirement that conditioned appeal in termination of parental rights case on
indigent parent's ability to pay record preparation fees).
127 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). But cf Ross, 417 U.S. at 618-I9 (holding that there was no right to appointed counsel for discretionary appeal to a state's highest
court or for certiorari petitions to the Court).
128 Douglas,372 U.S. at 358.
129 Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 619, 6z1 (2005) (noting the complicated issues
often arising in guilty pleas and the fact that unrepresented defendants are ill-equipped "to
navigat[el the appellate process without a lawyer's assistance").
13o Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) ("The constitutional requirement of
substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an
active advocate ....); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276, 279 (2000) (holding that Anders
is "merely one method of satisfying the requirements of the Constitution for indigent criminal appeals" and finding that the California procedure "afford[s] indigents the adequate and
effective appellate review that the Fourteenth Amendment requires"); McCoy v. Court of
Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 443 (1988) (stating that the Wisconsin withdrawal rule does not "burden[] an indigent defendant's right to effective representation on appeal or to due process on
appeal").
131 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396 (1985).
132 Ross, 417 U.S. at 616; see Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1,z5-z6 (Stevens, J., dissent124

125
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to fairly present his ineffectiveness claims. 33 Simply put, closing collateral
review to defendants who have completed their prison sentences denies
defendants their right to obtain an adjudication of their ineffectiveness
claims. Because claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness can be adjudicated
on direct appeal, m it is fundamentally unfair to move the resolution of
such claims to a collateral process and then close that process to defendants
who complete their prison sentences while their direct appeal is pending.
When collateral review constitutes the first and only opportunity to review
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, due process obligates states to
provide "each defendant a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the
1 36
merits" 135 of his claims.
Excluding defendants who have served their sentences from the only
review process available to adjudicate ineffectiveness claims also violates
the equal protection principle that a system of reviewing convictions be
"free of unreasoned distinctions." 137 Once a state decides that the collateral
review process, rather than direct appeal, is the forum to adjudicate claims
of trial counsel ineffectiveness, it violates equal protection for that state to
grant review to some defendants and to "entirely cut off"' 3 others solely
on the basis of the length of the prison sentence imposed. Because all
ing) (noting that in Virginia the post-conviction proceedings "are key to meaningful appellate
review" as they "may present the first opportunity" to raise the issue of prior counsel's ineffectiveness).
133 See, Dripps supra note 62, at 8oi. Professor Dripps argues that where, as in Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (I99i), an ineffectiveness claim cannot be reviewed on direct appeal,
instead of seeing the post-conviction proceeding as serving the function of first appeal, "the
post-conviction trial court should be analogized to the initial trial court" because most claims
on appeal are first presented to the trial court. Dripps, supranote 62, at 8os. It is the appeal
from the denial of post-conviction relief "that constitutes, practically speaking, the first appeal from the rejection of an ineffectiveness claim." Id.
134 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
135 Evitts, 469 U.S. at 405.
136 In Daniels v. United States, the Court assumed the availability of a forum for a defendant to challenge the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S.
374, 381-83 (zooi). While the Court held that a defendant could not raise such a challenge
in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 when a state court conviction was used to enhance a
federal sentence, the Court noted that "a defendant generally has ample opportunity to obtain
constitutional review of a state conviction." Id. at 383. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
indicted that the "fundamental fairness inherent in 'due process' suggests that states have an
obligation to provide a forum for defendants to litigate ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims.
Id. at 386-87 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 298-99 (1992) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (explaining that due process requires that a defendant receive "a full and fair"
review of federal constitutional claims on direct or collateral review); Boumediene v. Bush, 128
S. Ct. 2229, 2268 (2008) (noting the importance of a full and fair review to minimize the risk
of an "erroneous deprivation of a liberty interest").
137 Rinaldi v.Yeager, 384 U.S. 305,310 (1966).
138 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 6oo, 612 ((1974) (citing Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 481
(1963).
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defendants sentenced to incarceration have a right to effective counsel
at trial, it is an "unreasoned distinction[]"' 3 9 for a state to deny collateral
review to defendants who have completed their sentences.14
B. Appellate Counsel Ineffectiveness
Unlike claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness, a claim of ineffectiveness
of direct appeal counsel must be presented in a state collateral proceeding.141
While a state has no obligation to provide for collateral review, 41 once
established, collateral review, like direct appeal, may not be structured in a
manner that violates equal protection.4 3 At a minimum, equal protection
requires a state to afford defendants "an adequate opportunity to present
1
[one's] claims fairly."'"
When a state closes collateral review to defendants
who have completed their sentences of imprisonment, it deprives defendants
of the only opportunity to present claims of ineffectiveness of direct
appeal counsel. There is simply no basis for a state to distinguish between
defendants claiming ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel on the basis of
the duration of imprisonment imposed. A defendant sentenced to a short
term of imprisonment and a defendant with a longer sentence both have a
right to an effective lawyer on direct appeal 45 because both will experience
the multiple collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. 46 As such,
139 Rinaldi,384 U.S. at 310.
14o Even if the defendant waives other asserted trial errors and immediately seeks collateral relief after his sentence is imposed, in some jurisdictions if the sentence is served
before collateral review is completed, relief cannot be granted. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9543(a)()(i) (West 2007).
141 As a general rule, a defendant cannot seek federal habeas corpus review of a constitutional claim unless the claim is first presented to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(i)
(2oo6); see, e.g., Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29(2004). Although exhaustion may be excused
in the absence of a state remedy, a defendant must nonetheless be in custody to be eligible
for habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(I)-(3) (zoo6).
,
142 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 555-57 (1987).
143 Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 194-95 (1966) (finding a violation of
equal protection to deny transcript to an indigent in an appeal from denial of post-conviction
relief); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484 (1963) (stating that Griffin principle is not limited
to "direct appeals . . . but extend[s] alike to state post conviction proceedings"); Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (t961) (holding that requiring filing fee for indigents seeking
state habeas corpus review violated the Equal Protection Clause).
I44 United States v. MacCollom,

426

U.S. 317, 324 (1976) (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417

U.S. 600, 6 16 (1974)).

145 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,409 (1985).
146 Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374,379-8 o (2001) ("States impose a wide range of
disabilities on those who have been convicted of crimes, even after their release.... Further,
each of the 50 States has a statute authorizing enhanced sentences for recidivist offenders.");
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) ("[Ilmprisonment for however short a time ...
may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting... [one's] career and ... reputation.");
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971) ("The practical effects of conviction of even
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equal protection requires that collateral review be open to defendants
without regard to the length of imprisonment imposed so that they may
"vindicate their right to effective ... counsel." 147
IV.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN COLLATERAL PROCEEDINGS

Without a right to appointed counsel, simply opening collateral review
to defendants who have served their sentences will not provide indigent
defendants an "adequate opportunity"' 148 to challenge the effectiveness
of prior counsel. Even if an unrepresented defendant is not incarcerated,
it is unlikely he can effectively interview prior counsel and otherwise
investigate decisions made by counsel, which constitute the minimum
actions necessary to establish an ineffectiveness of counsel claim. 149 In
several cases prior to Massaroand before the recent movement among states
to defer ineffectiveness claims to the collateral process, the Court held
that indigent defendants do not have a constitutional right to appointed
counsel when challenging their conviction in a collateral proceeding. In
Pennsylvania v. Finley,150 the Court concluded that "fundamental fairness"
does not require the appointment of counsel because "collateral attack...
normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through
The equal protection guarantee of
direct review of his conviction."''
"meaningful access"' 52 was not violated because by the time Finley
sought collateral relief, she had been represented on direct appeal. The
Finley Court held that its conclusion in Ross v. Moffitt, that a defendant's
access to appellate briefs and opinions "provided sufficient tools" 15 3 for an
unrepresented defendant to gain meaningful access to discretionary review,
applied to post-conviction review.'14
In holding that Finley applied no differently in capital cases than in
non-capital cases, the plurality in Murray v. Giarratanol55 again noted the
petty offenses ... are not to be minimized.").
147 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986).
148 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 6oo, 616 (1974).
149 See Dripps supra note 62, at 799; see also Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005)
(noting that navigating the legal process is "well beyond the competence" of many defendants who have "little education, learning disabilities, and mental impairments").
i5o Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987) (holding that procedures governing
withdrawal by direct appeal counsel do not apply to post-conviction counsel).
15I1 Id. at 557.
152 Ross, 417 U.S. at 6II.
153 Finley, 481 U.S. at 557.
154 In supporting this position, the Court said, "[Slince a defendant has no federal constitutional right to counsel when pursuing a discretionary appeal on direct review of his conviction, afortiori,he has no such right when attacking a conviction that has long since become
final upon exhaustion of the appellate process." Id. at 555.
155 Murrayv. Giarratano, 492 U.S. i, I0(1989) (plurality opinion).
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relationship between direct appeal and collateral review. 116 "State collateral
proceedings ... serve a different and more limited purpose than the trial
or appeal." 57
The Court returned to the issue of counsel in state collateral proceedings
in Coleman v. Thompson.158 In Coleman, under Virginia law, claims of
ineffectiveness of trial and direct appeal counsel could be brought only
in a state collateral proceeding." 9 When collateral relief was denied after
an evidentiary hearing at which the defendant was represented by stateappointed counsel, counsel failed to file a timely appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court.160 In a subsequent federal habeas corpus action, the
district court and Fourth Circuit found that the claims raised in the state
collateral proceeding were procedurally defaulted when Coleman failed
to appeal the denial of state collateral relief.161 In affirming the denial of
habeas corpus relief, the Court held that the error committed by collateral
review appellate counsel did not constitute cause to excuse the procedural
default 6 because Coleman did not have a constitutional right to counsel
on appeal from the denial of state collateral relief. 13 The Court left open
whether "there must be an exception to the rule of Finley and Giarratano
in those cases where state collateral review is the first place a prisoner
can present a challenge to his conviction. " 164 The Court concluded that
it was not required to answer the question because Coleman's federal
constitutional claims were addressed in the trial court collateral proceeding,
and the "effectiveness of Coleman's counsel before that court [was] not
at issue."' 65 Because the collateral proceeding in which Coleman was

I56 Id. at 9. The plurality referred to Barefoot v. Estelle in which the Court noted that
"direct appeal is the primary avenue for a review of a conviction or sentence." Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 88o, 887 (1983).
157 Murray, 492 U.S. at Io;see Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right
to Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1o89 (2OO6)
(arguing that "Giarratanodid not decide that there is no right to counsel in state [collateral]
proceedings in capital cases," but only rejected the claim on the facts and record before the
Court).
158 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991).
159 Id. at 755.
16o Id. at 727.
161 Id. at 728.
162 In Murray v. Carrier,the Court held that lawyer error did not constitute cause for
excusing a procedural default unless the lawyer was "constitutionally ineffective under the
standard established in Stricklandv. Washington." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986);
see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). The Stricklandstandard applies only in
proceedings where there is a constitutional right to counsel. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S.
586, 587-88 (1982) (per curiam).
163 Coleman, 5o U.S. at 757.
164 Id. at 755.
165 Id.
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represented served as Coleman's "one and only appeal" 66for claims of trial
error and ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel, Coleman had not
167
been denied "an adequate opportunity to present his claims."'
The Court's rationale for not finding a right to counsel in Finley and
Giarratanoand the Coleman Court's decision not to rule on whether there
must be an exception to Finley and Giarratano,argue for a right to appointed
counsel when state collateral review is the first opportunity for a defendant
to challenge the effectiveness of prior counsel. The Court's case law on
when an indigent defendant has a right to appointed counsel on appeal
168
supports this argument. In a first appeal as of right, Douglas v. California
69
holds that the "equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment"'
requires states to appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants. 7 ' In
its ruling, the Court emphasized that at issue was the "merits of the one and
only appealan indigent has as of right."71 '

166 Id. at 756.
167 Id. (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 6oo, 616 (974). Some decisions post-Coleman
fail to acknowledge the question left open in that case. See, e.g., Gulertekin v. Tinnelman-Cooper,
340 F3d 415,425-26 (6th Cir. 2003); Henderson v. Sargent,926 E2d 706, 7 o n.6 (8th Cir. 1991),
reh'ggrantedandamendedby 939 E2d 586 (8th Cir. i99i), reh'g deniedby 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
19766 (8th Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion), stay denied by 502 U.S. 977 (199I); Johnson v.
Singletary, 938 E zd i166, 1175 (1 Ith Cir. 1991). Other decisions reject the claim that collateral
counsel's ineffectiveness can serve as cause under a Coleman exception. See, e.g., Hillv. Jones,
8I F3d IO5, 1025 (1 ith Cir. 1996); Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ga. 1999). Decisions
also recognize the open issue but find that circuit precedent precludes consideration of the
issue. See, e.g., Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F3d 229, 240 (5th Cir. 2001). Finally, other decisions
conclude that Coleman bars a right to counsel until the Court determines otherwise. See, e.g.,
Mackallv.Angelone, 131 E3d 442,449 (4th Cir. 1997) ("As an inferior appellate court, we are not
at liberty to disregard [Coleman as] controlling authority.").
168 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
169 Id. at 358.
170 Id. at 357. Under the California Rules of Criminal Procedure the intermediate appellate court appointed counsel for an indigent after the court investigated the record and
determined that counsel would be useful to the defendant or the court. The reviewing court
was "forced to prejudge the merits" of indigent defendant appeals, while it determined the
merits of other defendant's appeals "only after having the full benefit of written briefs and oral
argument by counsel." Id. at 356. The Court left open whether California would be required
to provide counsel for an indigent seeking discretionary review. Id.
171 Id. at 357 (emphasis added). Douglas was preceded by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956) (plurality opinion). Griffin addressed the requirement in Illinois that defendants
needed a transcript of the trial in order obtain adequate appellate review of their conviction.
Defendants claimed that they were too poor to purchase a transcript and that the state's refusal to make the transcript available violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 15. The Court held a state could not grant appellate
review in such a manner that "discriminates against some convicted defendants on account
of their poverty." Id. at i8. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971) (holding
that Griffin prevented the state from denying an indigent appellant, convicted of ordinance
violations punishable only by a fine, a record of the trial to permit consideration of his claims
by the appellate court).
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In Ross v. Moffitt, 7 ' the Court held that neither due process nor equal
protection required the state to appoint counsel for indigent defendants
seeking discretionary review before North Carolina's highest court.'73 In
174
concluding that the defendant had not been denied "meaningful access"
to discretionary review, the Court noted that the defendant had counsel
on direct appeal as of right and, consequently, would have access to the
transcript of the trial, the brief his lawyer had submitted to the direct appeal
court, and the opinion, if any, of that court.175 These materials would provide
the discretionary court an "adequate basis ... to grant or deny review."' 76 As
a result, "the indigent defendant [had] an adequate opportunity to present
his claims"' 77 to the discretionary appellate court.
The state's obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to appoint
appellate counsel for indigents was recently considered by the Court in
Halbertv.Michigan.7 8 Following an amendment to the Michigan constitution
making the first appeal by a defendant who pleads guilty discretionary,'79
Halbert challenged the subsequent decision by the Michigan courts not
to appoint counsel for such a defendant.1 0 In holding that due process
and equal protection require the appointment of counsel for defendants
convicted on guilty pleas who seek review in Michigan's intermediate
appellate court, the Court concluded that two factors persuaded it that
Halbert's case was controlled by DouglasM rather than Ross v. Moffitt."I First,
in contrast to Ross, Michigan's intermediate appellate court examined the
172

Ross, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).

173 Id.at 616.

174 Id.at 6i i.
175 Id.at 614-15.
176 Id. at 615. In contrast to Douglas,the Court noted that discretionary review was governed by factors other than the correctness of the decision of the intermediate appellate court.
Id. at 613. Cases could be selected for review if "[tihe subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest," or "involves legal principles of major significance," or if the decision
below is "likely to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court." Id. at 614.; see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1969).
177 Ross, 417 U.S. at 616. Ross also considered whether the state was obligated to appoint
counsel for defendants seeking review of their convictions in the United States Supreme
Court. Id. at 616-17. The Court held that the reasons it concluded the defendant had not
been denied an adequate opportunity to present his claims to the discretionary court were
"equally relevant" as to why the state did not have a constitutional obligation to appoint
counsel for a defendant petitioning the Court for review. Id. at 617-18.
178 Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2oo5).
179 See id. at 612 (showing that when a defendant was found guilty at trial, Michigan law
provided for direct appeal as of right).
18o Id.at 6o9; see also People v. Harris, 681 N.W.zd 653, 653 (Mich. 2004), abrogatedby
Halbert,545 U.S. 605; People v. Bulger, 614 N.W.zd 103, io8, 114-15 (Mich. 2ooo), abrogated
by Halbert, 545 U.S. 605.
18I Douglasv. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
182 Halbert,545 U.S. at 6o6; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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merits of the claims presented in the application for discretionary review
and not the general importance of the issues presented in the appeal. 183
Second, the intermediate court's ruling "provides the first, and likely the
only, direct review the defendant's conviction and sentence will receive."4
Unlike a defendant who has counsel on direct appeal, an unrepresented,
plea-convicted defendant seeking "first-tier"1 85 review will not have the
benefit of a brief prepared by a lawyer or an opinion by a reviewing court.
Finally, the Court noted that appealing a case "without a lawyer's assistance
is a perilous endeavor for a layperson"' 86 and beyond the abilities of many
defendants who have little education and who may be further limited by
learning and mental impairments."7
The reasoning of the Court in Douglas, Ross, and Halbert supports a
due process and equal protection right to counsel when a state collateral
proceeding is the only opportunity to challenge the effectiveness of trial
or appellate counsel. As in Douglas, the collateral proceeding is the "one
and only appeaf'188 available to a defendant when direct appeal is closed to
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel or when trial counsel is obligated
to represent the defendant on direct appeal."8 9 The collateral proceeding
is also the only "appeal" for claims of ineffectiveness of direct appeal
counsel. Without counsel in the collateral proceeding, indigent defendants
are "denied meaningful access"'19° to the only forum available to challenge
the ineffectiveness of prior counsel because of their poverty.1 91 Unlike
discretionary appeal, defendants seeking collateral review do not have
access to a brief prepared by a lawyer or an opinion of a court that ruled on
the claim. Like the discretionary review at issue in Halbert,collateral review
of claims of ineffectiveness of trial or direct appeal counsel constitute "firsttier review."' 92 When collateral review substitutes for appeal as of right and
is the only opportunity to present ineffectiveness claims, the fairness and
equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment require the state to
appoint counsel for indigent defendants.

183 Halbert, 545 U.S. at 6o6-o7.
184 Id.at 607.
185 Id. at 606.
186 Id. at62 1.
187 Id.
188 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (emphasis added).
189 See Freedman, supra note 157, at io94 n.82; see also Mackall v. Angelone, 131 E3 d
442, 452 (4th Cir. 1997) (Butzner, J., dissenting) (stating that when a state declines to review
ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal, the indigent defendant is entitled to counsel because
the collateral proceeding is "the only forum available" to the defendant to challenge the effectiveness of prior counsel).
19o Ross v. Moflitt, 417 U.S. 6oo, 615 (1974).
191 Halbert, 545 U.S. at 624 n.8.
192

Id. at 6o6.
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The Court's due process case law also entitles an indigent defendant
to appointed counsel when a collateral proceeding is the only opportunity
to challenge the effectiveness of prior counsel.'93 Like direct appeal, state
post-conviction proceedings are subject to due process protections. 94 As
the Court has noted, the "ordinary mechanism" 19 for determining what
procedures are required to ensure that liberty is not deprived without due
process of law is the balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldidge.'9
In determining whether a due process violation exists, a critical aspect
of the Mathews inquiry is the "fairness and reliability of the existing...
procedures"' 197 balanced against the "probable value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards." 198 Under this test, the due process implications
of denying indigents counsel is plain: without the assistance of counsel
and without the "tools"' 199 a pro se litigant has following direct appeal,
an indigent defendant, even one not incarcerated, is denied meaningful
access to the post-conviction process. Moreover, as the Court observed
in Halbert, indigent defendants are "particularly handicapped" z°° by lack
of education, learning disabilities and mental impairments to act as "selfrepresentatives."' 01 That the majority of states appoint counsel in collateral
proceedings in non-capital cases 02 and thirty-three states provide counsel
in capital cases 03 demonstrates that assistance of counsel is a necessary
193 See id.
194 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 , 556-57 (1987) (finding that the procedures followed by defendant's post-conviction counsel "fully comported with fundamental fairness
...mandated by the Due Process Clause").
195 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528 (2004) (plurality opinion) (determining what
process is due citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as enemy combatant).
196 Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see Lassiter v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 452
U.S. 18, 26-27 (198I) (using Mathews balancing test and concluding that counsel need not be
appointed in every parental termination case but recognizing that in a given case fundamental
fairness may require the appointment of counsel).
197 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343.
198 Id.
199 Finley, 481 U.S. at 557 (noting that because Finley had been represented on direct
appeal, she would have "sufficient tools" in the form of the trial record, appellate briefs and
opinions to gain meaningful access to post-conviction review).
2oo Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605,607 (zoo5).
201 Id.
202 1WILKES, supra note 1o, at § 1.5.
203 See ARK. CODE ANN. § I6-19-202(a)(i)(A)(I) (2oo6); CAL.GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West
1998); FLA STAT. ANN. § 27.702 (West 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/122-2.i (West 2008);
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-40-1-2(a) (LexisNexis 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-45o6(d)(1)(C)(2)
(2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.1 IO(Z)(C) (West 2oo6); LA. REv. STAT. ANN, § 15:149.1 (2005);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-1o8(a) (LexisNexis 2oo8); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-23(9)
(West 2oo6); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-201 (3)(b)(I) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-3402(1)
(2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 3-34.820 (ZOO5); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-5 (West Supp. 2009);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3 1-16-3 (LexisNexis 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45 I(c) (2007); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 2953.21(I)(I) (LexisNexis 2009); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355.6 (West 2003);
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"additional ...procedural safeguard" z 4 to ensure that the one and only
proceeding to challenge the effectiveness of prior counsel is fundamentally
fair.
CONCLUSION

A defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of trial
and direct appeal counsel without regard to the length of imprisonment
imposed. If a state chooses to defer claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel
to the post-conviction process or, as a condition of appointment, requires
trial counsel to represent the defendant on direct appeal, the state violates
fairness and equality mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment if it closes
the post-conviction process to defendants who complete their prison
sentence while direct appeal is pending. Limiting the post-conviction
remedy only to defendants who are in custody is also unconstitutional
because it denies defendants who have completed their prison sentence
access to the only forum in which they can challenge the effectiveness of
direct appeal counsel. Simply put, the right to effective trial and direct
appeal counsel is of "no value"20° if a state denies access to the only
procedure to enforce the right. When the post-conviction process serves as
the "one and only appeal" 3 6 for claims of ineffectiveness of trial and direct
appeal counsel, fairness and equality require the state to appoint counsel
for indigent defendants.

Oa. REV. STAT. § 138.590 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-16o(B) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 21-27-4 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-202(2)(a) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7
(2004); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 11.071(2) (Vernon 2005); WYo. STAT. ANN. §
7-6-i4(c)(i) (2oo9); ARiz. R. CRIM. P,32.4; IDAHO CRIM. R. 44.2; Mo. R. CRIM.P.24.o36(a); PA.
R. CRIM P. 9o4(G)(1); "'NN Sup. CT. R. 13(d)(I)(D); WASH. R. APP. P. 16.25.
204 Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976).
205 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,393 (1914).
206 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756 (199I)

U.S. 353, 357 (1963)).

(quoting Douglas v. California, 372,

